The motorway and railway connection between Denmark and Sweden, opened on 1 July 2000, when taken together with the connection across the Great Belt between the largest Danish islands, now provides a direct link between the Scandinavian peninsular and the rest of Europe. At a total cost of some 8 billion US dollars, these projects represented the largest infrastructural investments of their kind in Europe. Although backed by strong political and economic interests, these projects were also opposed by a part of the public and especially by political and environmental interest groups. This opposition was particularly pronounced in the case of the Denmark-Sweden link, partly owing to its location in a densely populated area and partly due to the potential impacts of the proposed link on the very sensitive local and regional marine environment. Thus, alongside the task of designing and constructing the physical link, the consortium that was responsible for its realisation, Øresundsbro Konsortiet, had to find ways to satisfy these many diverse interests. This paper describes how Øresundsbro Konsortiet, being an owner that valued constructive partnership, took up these challenges in their management, and how the environmental concerns were accommodated in the design and construction methods. Furthermore, it describes how the socio-technical approaches already taken up and developed within hydroinformatics in earlier projects were taken much further in the case of the Denmark-Sweden link. Finally, the paper describes the role of hydroinformatics in the various phases of the project and its significance in achieving the successful completion. The role of hydroinformatics as an important technology in facilitating stakeholder dialogue is thereby also clearly illustrated.
INTRODUCTION
The proposal to construct the Øresund link aroused substantial opposition, however, both in Denmark and in Sweden, and certainly much more than had been experienced in the case of the Great Belt link. In both cases, the marine environment was a major concern because of the threat that these constructions clearly posed to the local marine environments, and even beyond, to the environment of the Baltic. However, owing to the bi-national nature of the Øresund Link project, its location in a densely populated region with 3 million people using the Øresund for recreation, and within an area of great environmental sensitivity, the environmental debate became very intense and the environmental issue indeed came to have the biggest impact.
The task of constructing this link thus became not only one of the constructing of the physical works themselves, but also, and even essentially, one of answering to the concerns, expectations and requirements of a diverse range of formal and informal stakeholders. Thus, when the consortium that was formed to construct the link (Øresundsbro Konsortiet, or ØSK) received permission to proceed with the construction, it was faced with a number of choices regarding how to address the wide range of requirements from the authorities, interested parties and the general public-often against the background of an as yet undecided code of governance and regulation.
Øresundsbro Konsortiet chose to take on the project's political sensitivity as a challenge. The surrounding world's requirements, for instance, with regard to the design of the facility and the link's environmental impact, were incorporated into the detailed planning as technical problems to be resolved. This gave the proposed solutions a high degree of visibility and allowed them to be communicated to and discussed with the organisations that had presented them. Without the accommodation of these concerns in the design and construction methods, it is almost certain that this project could not have been The task of informing the politicians, the responsible authorities and the public as a whole in a truthful and realistic way about the consequences of the construction and, inseparably from this, the empowering of these to act as genuine stakeholders in the management of the natural environment, was a task of hydroinformatics over and above its tasks within the physical project itself.
In order to perform this task within such a PublicPrivate type of project, hydroinformatics had to employ existing technologies as well as introduce new technologies and adapt to new social-institutional arrangements, even while contributing to elaborating the strategies by which the project had to be designed and managed. Some of the technologies could be taken over from experience on other very large projects, but some were quite original. Some of the strategies were hitherto untried. This paper describes the corresponding developments, which made the construction of the link between Denmark and Sweden possible.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The social breakthrough realised by the application of hydroinformatics
As with many other great engineering enterprises, the projects for constructing road and rail links between the two largest Danish islands and the European mainland, and between Denmark and Sweden, have been discussed for well over a century. Problems of technical feasibility, financial viability and political desirability have largely frustrated attempts to bring these projects to fruition up until quite recent times. With the greater economic and increasing political integration of Europe, many of these more traditional problems have been largely overcome. At the same time, however, they have been joined by new problems, and in the first place by problems concerning the sustainability of the natural environment, both during and following the execution of the projects. In many cases, this new class of problems concerning the natural environment, commonly engaging the attention of large parts of the general public, has made it much more difficult to realise projects that have an obvious and direct impact upon the natural environment. As a result, persons responsible for the execution of many, and probably most, great engineering works can no longer restrict themselves to the physical realisation of the works, but must increasingly direct their attention to the political and public acceptability of these works, and especially with respect to the natural environment. This is to say that works that were originally conceived in terms of steel and concrete have now also to be conceived in terms of people and a wide range of natural organisms. It was the emergence of this new kind of socio-political/institutional environment that led to the emergence of a new discipline, which was that of hydroinformatics (Abbott 1991) . As will be explained here, this new discipline has played and will continue to play an important, and sometimes essential, role in making such projects possible.
As concerns the subject of the present paper, the road and rail link between Denmark and Sweden, the way to its realisation through the use of hydroinformatics was prepared, for a large part, by two earlier projects. The first of these was that of the protection of the city of Venice against flooding, a project that, although now extensively investigated, has still not been realised. The second such project undertaken on the way to the present one was that of the road and rail link across the Great Belt, between the Danish island of Sjaelland (and the many other islands already connected to it) and the island of Fyn (which had been connected to mainland Denmark in the 1930s). The first of these projects, that of Venice if executed, would be of the same order of magnitude in financial outlay as the project considered here, which was of the order of 3.7 billion US dollars, while the Great Belt connection was somewhat larger, coming out at about 4.2 billion US dollars, with both amounts being at the then-current exchange rates. The positions of these links are shown in Figure 2 . 
The formation of the public-private partnership project
The political challenge that then arose was one of identifying an operational way to accommodate these immediate concerns as expressed by the opposition. This accommodation had itself to be anchored in the enabling legislation, and this legislation had to be of a kind When the Øresundsbro Konsortiet was established in 1992 the project's overall political, economic and environmental parameters were clear from the outset (Lundhus 2000) . Yet the project had still to define its own visions, targets and standards in order to fulfil successfully the expectations expressed in the framework set out by the politicians in the two countries.
Thus, right from the beginning, the project had to co-exist with 'political-consumers', i.e. stakeholders outside its immediate group of owners, users and employees, These 'political consumers' all wished to exert their influence in order to protect their own interests and exert influence on the link's design and its operation.
The enormous public attention given to the project and the lively environmental debate surrounding it meant that the environmental authorities in particular had to demonstrate that they were being independent and strong in all their dealings with Øresundsbro Konsortiet. A diverse range of organisations and private individuals all demanded influence, too. They were, and continue to be, active in the public debate, putting pressure on politicians and the authorities as well as on the Øresundsbro Konsortiet itself. Local residents, the sailing fraternity, and companies located in the vicinity of Øresund, for example, have insisted on the adoption of particularly responsible attitudes during the construction period.
The realities of the political ownership, the expectations within local communities, the requirements of the authorities, and a critical press, all led very early to the formulation of the first two management principles, as follows: (1) The participants in the process must be treated as partners (this also includes informal stakeholders). All involved authorities, consultants, and contractors are These circumstances were taken up as challenges as well.
The approval process involved 10 public hearings addressing different components of the project and more than 150 authorities were engaged in this process . The basis for the hearings were environmental impact assessments based on comprehensive Area and are waters of great importance as feeding, resting, nesting and moulting places for many bird species and a small population of common seals and a few grey seals (see Figure 10 ).
In connection with the stipulation of the environmental requirements, the authorities defined an 'inner impact zone', covering an area of 500 m either side of the Link trajectory, including compensation dredging areas, and an 'outer impact zone' that extended 7 km on either side of the inner impact zone.
Environmental Quality Objective-Øresund In addition, the Danish authorities established a series of restrictions on benthic flora and fauna, bathing water quality, bird foraging in shallow waters, and other issues.
It was essential to the social acceptability of the project that the extent to which these criteria were satisfied could be controlled by all the principal stakeholders and that these should accordingly be fully informed in real time of all relevant developments and empowered to intervene in all ongoing and planned processes if they considered that these conflicted with the pre-established agreements. The Øresundsbro Konsortiet had therefore to take account of stakeholder power at all times and respond accordingly, if necessary closing down whole processes if these were found unacceptable to one of the stakeholders. The means by which this condition was realised are described later in this paper.
INTRODUCTION TO THE HYDRAULIC DESIGN STAGE: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIES
The design of the link on its hydraulic and water environmental sides followed from, partially overlapped and continuously interacted with, the environmental debate. The design stage was itself composed of two parts, the one that in its final form would meet the overall requirements and the other concerned with elaborating construction procedures that would satisfy the above criteria during the construction period.
The following examples may serve to illustrate how environmental management was perceived and performed by the owner so as to ensure that these requirements and expectations were met. Later, the hydroinformatics tools used and developed to achieve these goals will be described. Three main alternatives were chosen and presented to the authorities, to an international expert panel and to the general public through the public hearings. The aim was to find a solution that reduced the blocking effect of the constructions to a minimum, while providing substantial reductions in the compensatory dredging volumes and at The consequence of this environmentally optimised design (see Table 1 ) of the link was that the strongest political argument against the Link was eliminated, leading to the Swedish government's approval of the construction of the link on Swedish territory in June 1994 (under the condition that a number of environmental demands were met). In addition, the risk of long-term environmental effects on the Baltic Sea was minimised.
Environmental optimisation of the design
In order to fulfil the zero solution for the optimised layout described above, a design was prepared in which approximately 4 million m 3 of soil had to be excavated from the seabed in the region of the link alignment to compensate for the blocking by the bridge pillars, the artificial island and peninsula. Approximately 2.5 million m 3 of these were associated with deepening and realignment of navigation channels. Compared with the link Figure 10 | The environmental concerns for the Øresund were related to potential effects from sediment spill on shading on macro algae, impact on mussels, fish migration, birds and bathing water quality. A considerable effort was also put into the aesthetics of the project in order to increase its acceptability further.
Thus, for example, the artificial island was 'sculpted' into a pleasing form for the millions of persons flying over it into Copenhagen airport, while its stone wave protection was carefully chosen in a uniform dark-red colour in order to provide visual pleasure for those sailing past it. The final layout of the link is shown in Figure 11 .
During the initial phase 1990-91 and in the design optimisation phase 1992-94 the environmental consequences of the proposed link were studied using a number of 2D deterministic free-surface flow models. These models, which were all generated using the MIKE 21 modelling system, were applied to calculate the flow- thereby provided the understanding of the complex local and regional flow phenomena. These also provided the confidence that solutions that would satisfy the requirements would be obtainable.
Management and execution of the works in an environmental context
Early in the process of preparing the environmental impact assessment, or EIA, the potential major impact in the Øresund area was identified as originating in the dispersal of spilled sediments from the dredging and reclamation activities. Consequently, a great effort was put into organising the environmental monitoring in order to ensure that the criteria for the emissions would be met.
However, the fulfilment of the framework type Two major tools were introduced to ensure that the spill was kept below the limits necessary to fulfil the objectives and criteria for all the variables:
• The contractor was held responsible through his contract for keeping the spill below specified limits varying in time and space, taking into consideration the environmentally sensitive periods and areas.
• A feedback-monitoring programme was implemented to covering sediment spill, the dispersal hereof and biological key variables representing the most sensitive benthic communities. conditions of the common mussels and larvae were related back to maximum allowable rates of sedimentation in the sea bed area covered by the mussels banks.
The impact area around the link ( < 7 km) was divided into six eelgrass impact zones reflecting the intensity of the dredging operations, and the model was used to define the geographical and chronological distribution of spill in the different impact zones. The resulting spill rate distribution was integrated into the dredging contract between the owner and the dredging contractor.
This transformation of general 'political' requirements to contractual requirements and specifications for the
Control & Monitoring Programme can be illustrated in the following way (see Figure 12 ).
The division of responsibilities between the owner and the contractor meant in general terms that the contractor had to take full responsibility for the environmental effects of his own choice of detailed design, construction methods, choice of materials, etc., while the owner took full responsibility for the establishment of the Fixed Link and for securing that the total consequences of more than one contractor's work did not result in environmental effects exceeding the bounds set by the overall environmental requirements.
The owner used several different tools in order to make sure that this distribution of responsibilities functioned adequately in practice.
The first of these was incorporated in the 'Dredging Instructions' (Graveinstruks), which served as a quality document for administering the requirement set up by Øresundsbro Konsortiet to reduce the spill to 5% on average and to reduce the spill in time, extreme intensity and space.
The second tool was the Feedback Monitoring
Programme, which served both as a planning tool and as a tool for a timely control of the environmental consequences of the ongoing works.
The dredging and reclamation activities required in connection with both temporary and permanent works comprised 17 separate work plans. For each of these, detailed EIA's were made and reported in a 'Dredging Instruction' submitted to the authorities for approval.
The authorities performed an independent control, based on an annual survey of the environmental conditions in Øresund in general. The authorities were, on this basis and on the basis of the owner's reports, responsible for reporting to the parliaments and governments of the two countries.
Information management
In order to keep the public actively informed about the plans and progress relating to the environment as well progression of the works could be followed directly by a number of on-site web cameras and a photo archive with stills and aerial views was maintained.
As described later, a central environmental information and management system, called EAGLE, was developed linking the control and monitoring programmes together.
This system was also accessible via the Internet, being primarily targeted at the formal stakeholders but with links to computers at the Exhibition centres allowing a broader audience as well to observe and learn that the environment was being well cared for in real time. During the last year before completion, three international conferences, jointly organised by Øresundsbro Konsortiet, the main contractors and international associations, were held, one in Malmö focusing on bridges and two in Copenhagen about the challenges, solutions and lessons learned within the subject area of Dredging, Reclamation and Submerged Tunnels. These 'sharing and dissemination of knowledge' events materialised in conference proceeding volumes and at present three books about the Øresund Link Project featuring the same aspects are in the process of being published.
THE HYDROGRAPHIC MONITORING AND MODELLING EMPLOYED AT THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION STAGES
The hydrographic conditions in Øresund were investi- Phoenics-based models for this purpose, but these were not employed for all 3D modelling. All the DHI models of this kind, which were used throughout the project, were generated from the third-generation, System 3, and subsequently from its fourth-generation successor, the MIKE 3, Great attention was given in this project to the accuracy of positioning of all components, whether these were anchored or towed instruments, model grid points or constructional elements. GPS equipment was employed extensively and played a major part in ensuring the success of the entire project. Within this context, it was shown again in this project that a much greater attention than hitherto had to be given to the chart and map projections that were employed for positioning and recording the positions of instruments and for setting up Ultimately, the model results were applied to demonstrate that all acceptance criteria were fulfilled for the final layout of the link, including the compensation dredging.
The feedback monitoring programme
Being responsible for the control of the marine biological impacts of the different contractors' construction works, Øresundsbro Konsortiet developed a Feedback using measured hydrodynamic and meteorological boundary conditions. The hindcasts resulted in updated bases for forecast modelling, upon which even more accurate forecasts could be constructed.
As introduced earlier, the Feedback Monitoring
Programme provided content for both formal stakeholders (owner, contractor and authorities) and informal stakeholder (public, media, etc.) consumption, as well as for technical and environmental design and construction purposes. A further institutional innovation was then necessary as a means of linking to and mediating between this programme and its 'market'. This innovation took the form of a Feedback Monitoring Centre (FBC), which will also be described later in this paper. Figure 19 illustrates the layout of the system employed.
By the time that the Sound project was initiated it had been clearly demonstrated, and especially from the Venice and Great Belt investigations, that numerical modelling was of limited value unless it was supported by adequate field measurements, and that field measurements and their databases were usually of even less value unless their products were integrated in and related through numerical modelling studies (Abbott 1991) . The Sound project extended this understanding further by integrating many different kinds and sources of data to provide the bases for a more complete knowledge of environmental developments, and even as a means to promote a better understanding of events. Thus, for example, the development of submerged grass meadows (covering some 132 km 2 of the seabed in the immediate vicinity of the link) was followed using satellite observations, aerial photography, towed acoustic Doppler surveys and numerical and data-driven modelling. This combination of facilities was later augmented by advanced data mining techniques for automating the classification of the extent and type of bed vegetation (a system that is presently being further developed by DHI into a general sea bed mapping tool). Similarly, the positioning of each of the 50,000-ton submerged tunnel elements, carrying a four-line highway and a twotrack railway, was steered from on-line data sources connecting into encapsulations into neural networks of numerical modelling simulations and other, historic, data sources (Babovic et al. 2000) .
The measurement programme also covered unprec- indicator of the condition and extent of the bed vegetation generally. Figure 21 shows the 15 km 2 extent of blue mussels (Mytilus edulis) and the distribution of mussel-dedicated measuring stations in the immediate proximity of the link.
Altogether there were 46 km 2 of mussel beds in the area influenced by the link construction (where a mussel bed was defined as an area of the seabed that was covered by more than 40% by mussels). It was estimated that there were on average some 92,000 tons of live mussels on these beds. The extent to which mussels were distributed in the immediate neighbourhood of the link is shown in Figure 22 . Observations of this kind continue, as outlined later in this paper.
There are of course many other forms of seabed fauna than eelgrass and mussels and the development of these also had to be investigated and monitored before and during the construction works. The distribution of the observation stations for the monitoring of fauna in relatively low water (as indicated by Macema) and in the This long period of preparation and testing, and the associated elaboration of the required instrumentation networks, suitable (e.g. SQL) databases and computational and graphics software, was also essential to the rapidity and reliability with which such resources could be mobilised in the Sound project.
All of these studies were in turn related back to the influences of the link-construction activities, and in particular to the plumes of fine materials that these released, sometimes traceable over distances of 100 km under strong and unidirectional current influences and shortperiod wave induced disturbances in shallower waters.
Dredging and reclamation
During Further to this, a probabilistic analysis of the spill monitoring system was carried out to establish methods for more rapidly estimating the amount of spill. This approach was used to reduce the frequencies of the shipbased spill measurements. Thus, the estimation approach was applied in order to predict the spill in periods where no spill measurements were carried out based on information from periods where spill measurements were carried out, as influenced by incoming real-time hydrographic and dredging data.
Results achieved with the Control and Monitoring
Programmes and related hydroinformatics activities
Since a particular importance accrued to the consequences of the dredging activities, a major part of the hydrographic investigations were directed to this aspect. 
CONCLUSION
The construction of the road and rail connection between 5. An important consequence of this situation was that the link was built to specification, its construction and operation satisfied all environmental conditions, it was constructed within its original budget and it was completed six months ahead of schedule. This was a compliment not only to all the parties concerned, but also to the achievement of hydroinformatics as a new discipline in this field of endeavour.
